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Newspapers,' magazines,' and academic journals' have focused public
attention on the general crisis in liability insurance. The medical malprac-
tice insurance crisis has polarized the positions of the insurance and legal
communities. The insurance industry views the problem as part of a gen-
eral litigation explosion driven by overgenerous jury awards, the unpre-
dictable scope of tort liability, overzealous attorneys, a highly litigious so-
cial climate, and disproportionate attorneys' fees. Not surprisingly, the
litigation bar blames skyrocketing premiums on the greed and mismanage-
ment of the insurance industry as well as on poor physician performance."
Physicians, whose insurance rates are soaring, are caught in a legal and
economic whirlpool. The intense debate has forced legislatures to generate
proposals to "solve" the crisis.' But recent regulatory proposals designed
to alleviate the high costs and unavailability of medical malpractice insur-
ance are as predictable as the crisis itself. Ten years ago, states faced a
similar situation. The regulatory proposals to mitigate rising premium
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Florida's Tort and Insurance Reform Act of 1986 established the Academic Task Force for Review
of the Insurance and Tort Systems to investigate problems of affordability and availability of all types
of liability insurance. The authors participated as members of the Task Force's research team. This
Article represents the authors' views.
1. See, e.g., Strasser, Both Sides Brace for Tort Battle, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 4;
Insurance Industry Under Fire, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1986, at Dl, col. 2.
2. See, e.g., The Liability Insurance Crisis, IssuEs ScI. & TECH., Fall 1986, at 40; The Malprac-
tice Mess, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 17, 1986, at 74.
3. See, e.g., Gifford & Nye, Litigation Trends in Florida: Saga of a Growth State, 39 U. FLA. L.
REV. 829 (1987); Posner, Trends in Medical Malpractice Insurance, 1970-1985, 49 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS: 37 (1986); Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521 (1987).
4. See Olender, The Great Insurance Fraud of the 80s, NAT'L L.J., July 21, 1986, at 15, col. 1
(urging that "tinkering with our time-honored judicial system cannot be permitted").
5. Early in their investigation the Academic Task Force stated that "medical malpractice emerged
as the most visible and probably most serious area of concern with the tort and insurance systems."
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costs that were offered then are strikingly similar to the current
proposals.6
Regardless of how various factions characterize the problem, a simple
fact remains: the crisis is real. In Florida the crisis is alarming.7 Hospitals
and physicians have cut back the scope of patient care and are refusing to
treat high risk patients in urgent need of medical assistance. 8 In some
cases, this failure to provide prompt medical care ended in patient deaths.
Two facts highlight and explain the critical nature of the problem. First,
the magnitude and rate of growth of medical malpractice premiums have
increased dramatically in Florida in the last decade, especially during the
last several years.'" This upward price spiral has forced physicians to re-
assess not only whether they can afford to purchase malpractice coverage,
but in some cases whether they should continue to practice medicine."
Some physicians are resorting to joint-underwriting associations because
of the unavailability of malpractice coverage; in other cases, physicians
simply go uninsured.' 2 The result is an aggregate physician pool that of-
6. See, e.g., Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice
Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417 (suggesting regulatory proposals such as joint underwriting, reinsur-
ance, and state-run insurance pools to displace commercially available insurance and suggesting modi-
fications of substantive tort rules). Examples would include limiting the liability of health care provid-
ers or limiting the claimants' recovery. These statutory caps, however, may have constitutional
deficiencies. Note, The Constitutionality of Florida's Cap on Noneconomic Damages in the Tort
Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 157 (1987). Other examples would be
modifications of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, statutes of limitations, the requirements of informed
consent, the collateral source rule, and contingent fee caps. Alternative methods of dispute resolution
including arbitration, mediation, patient compensation boards, and screening panels have also been
examined. See, Comment, supra; see also Improving the Liability System, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16, 1987,
at 17, col. 4 (Special Section) (summary of suggestions of American Bar Association Action Commit-
tee to Improve the Tort System).
7. In one of its recent newsletters, the American Medical Association dubbed Florida the "Beirut
of Health Care." Florida Watched On Medical Malpractice, Gainesville Sun, Aug. 17, 1987, at B3,
col. 2.
8. A recent example is the U.S. Coast Guard's evacuation from the Bahamas of a south Florida
resident with a severe gunshot wound. Despite the man's life-or-death situation, the Coast Guard's
operation center had to contact nine hospitals before it found a trauma center willing to accept him. A
Coast Guard spokesperson attributed this difficulty to a reduction in the number of hospital trauma
centers, a cutback partially spurred by the medical malpractice crisis. Nine Hospitals Turn Away
Wounded Man, Gainesville Sun, Oct. 1, 1987, at B3, col. 1.
9. See, e.g., Teen Dies Waiting For A Surgeon, Gainesville Sun, Aug. 22, 1987, at BI, col. 2.
10. For example, Table I shows that a claims-made medical malpractice policy with limits of
$1,000,000 per occurrence, and $3,000,000 aggregate, cost a family practitioner $4310 in 1983. In
January 1987, the same policy cost $15,123, an increase of approximately 250% over a four year
period. By July 1, 1987, the premium on the same policy increased to $18,415, a 21.8% increase in a
six month period. For a detailed examination of premium increases, see infra Table 1, infra notes
32-34 and 92-96 and accompanying text.
11. Some physicians in high risk specialties, such as obstetrics, are moving to other specialties.
Other physicians are leaving Florida for states where the medical malpractice insurance problem is
less severe. See ACADEMIC TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 5, at 247-50.
12. See Doctors Cut Back on Insurance, Palm Beach Post, Dec. 31, 1987, at Al, col. 1. Hospitals
generally require physicians to purchase the state-required minimum of $250,000 insurance. Unin-
sured doctors must establish an escrow account or obtain a letter of credit and agree to pay any
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fers reduced medical services and carries reduced malpractice insurance
coverage.
Second, insurers who are displeased with the level of insurance rate
increases in the state of Florida are considering discontinuing their ex-
isting malpractice coverage. Two of Florida's major medical malpractice
providers, St. Paul's and CIGNA, discontinued coverage during 1987, cit-
ing the refusal of the state regulatory authorities to grant sufficient in-
creases in premium rates. 3 A lingering suspicion among lawmakers is
that these demands stem from collusion among insurers. 4
This Article assesses the claim that the medical malpractice crisis is a
result of collusion. We focus on those structural conditions in the medical
malpractice insurance market which may permit or prevent collusion.
Particular attention is given to the situation in Florida for two reasons:
first, the crisis is more severe in Florida than elsewhere in the country;
second, the data available on Florida's medical malpractice insurance
market are unusually comprehensive, thanks to a study' of affordability
and availability problems in liability insurance mandated by the Florida
Legislature. 6 Our analysis first examines the requirements for, and con-
malpractice judgment up to $250,000 within 60 days of judgment. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.357
(Harrison 1984).
13. Medical Malpractice Costs and the Public Health, Miami Herald, May 3, 1987, at Cl, col.
1. CIGNA left in June, 1987. St. Paul's agreed to remain until the end of 1987, when it too left the
Florida market. See Doctors Cut Back on Insurance, supra note 12, at A12, col. 6.
14. See Johnston Lays Into Insurers, Gainesville Sun, June 19, 1986, at Al, col. 3. Florida Sen-
ate President Harry Johnston charged that "[i]f [the insurers] were under the Sherman Antitrust Act,
they'd all be in jail today." Id. at A12, col 2. In fact, seven state attorneys general recently filed
antitrust suits against four of the nation's largest commercial insurers. See Four Big Insurers
Charged With Scheme to Limit Commerical Liability Coverage, Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 1988, at 2, col.
3. The complaints cite "dozens of alleged secret meetings, dinner parties and behind-the-scenes
threats" that resulted in collusive prices. Id. "The basic thrust of the accusations is that a few of the
largest insurers pressured the rest of the industry to go along with certain policy-writing changes that
made it much tougher for public agencies, businesses, and nonprofit organizations to buy liability
insurance." Id. The suit alleges that the conspiracy caused the industry to shift from "occurrence"
coverage to "claims-made coverage." See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (discussing claims-
made coverage in Florida's medical malpractice insurance market). This litigation was preceeded by
antitrust claims that West Virginia instituted against a number of medical malpractice insurance com-
panies, including St. Paul's, accusing them of conspiracy to violate the state's antitrust laws. The suit
contends that five companies restrained trade by simultaneously deciding to terminate the liability
insurance of almost every doctor and half the hospitals in West Virginia. Strasser, Tort Crisis Focus
Shifts To Insurers, NAT'L L.J., June 9, 1986, at 1, col. 1. For other comments on collusion in the
insurance industry, see Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith, & Simon, Sources of the Crisis in Liability
Insurance: An Empirical Analysis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367 (1988) (discounting probability of collu-
sion); Angoff, Insurance Against Competition: How the McCarran Ferguson Act Raises Prices and
Profits in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 397 (1988) (statutory pro-
tection aids collusion).
15. ACADEMIC TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 5.
16. The nature of the medical malpractice crisis is typically denoted as both an availability and an
affordability problem. This phraseology masks the crux of the economic issue underlying the crisis
because both terms imply an all-or-nothing approach to the insurance crisis (i.e. either insurance is
both affordable and available or it is not). Instead, as used in this Article, the terms affordability and
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sequences of, successful collusion. We then present a detailed examination
of Florida's medical malpractice insurance market in an effort to deter-
mine whether medical malpractice premium increases are attributable to
high levels of concentration, barriers to entry, or other imperfections in
market structure. This analysis suggests that collusion in Florida markets
is unlikely. From a public policy perspective, then, regulators should avoid
structural modifications to existing insurance markets; collusion theories
do not explain the recent escalation in medical malpractice insurance
rates.
I. Collusion: Requirements, Conditions, and Consequences
The rapid rise in medical malpractice premiums has led many to sus-
pect the insurance companies of collusion. This Part reviews the theoreti-
cal consequences of, and requirements for, collusion, as well as the market
conditions that encourage it.
A. Theoretical Consequences of Collusion
When firms in an industry collude on price, the most likely result is
that price will rise above the competitive level and the quantity sold will
be restricted below the competitive level. In theory, the colluders attempt
to emulate the results of a monopoly.' 7 These results can be examined by
reference to models of competition and monopoly. The competitive model
is represented graphically by the familiar interaction of supply and
demand curves. Figure 1 illustrates a hypothetical market for medical
malpractice insurance. The marginal cost curve, MC, represents the sup-
ply curve, defining the aggregate amount of malpractice insurance that
insurers are willing to supply at various premium rates. 8 The demand
curve, D, represents the aggregate amount of insurance the medical com-
munity is willing to purchase at various premium rates. Absent collusion
and under competitive market conditions, premium rates will tend toward
equilibrium at the level of output where the amount of insurance de-
manded equals the amount of insurance supplied. In Figure 1, the com-
petitive premium is Pc and the competitive quantity of insurance is Q.
availability are distinct concepts. For instance, insurance may be expensive but still affordable. It is
the degree of affordability of malpractice insurance relative to the costs of other goods and services
that is relevant. Affordability is also related to availability because as insurance costs increase af-
fordability decreases and availability declines.
17. See Patinkin, Multiple-Plant Firms, Cartels, and Imperfect Competition, 61 Q.J. ECON. 173,
192-200 (1947).
18. The marginal cost curve in Figure 1 is based on the assumption that the provision of insur-
ance is a constant-cost industry. Therefore, the marginal cost curve also represents the industry's
average cost, AC, curve.
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If insurers collude, however, they will attempt to behave collectively as
a multi-plant monopolist would individually. Because a monopolist oper-
ates at an output level where marginal cost equals marginal revenue, suc-
cessful collusion" results in restricted output, Q., and increased premi-
ums, Pm" This outcome reduces consumer welfare in two ways. First,
consumers who continue to purchase the restricted output pay higher pre-
miums. Second, higher premiums force some consumers to forego purchas-
ing insurance.20
19. There are a number of reasons why a cartel's efforts may not be wholly successful, For a
detailed examination, see R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 140-46 (1985).
20. See Id. at 35-36.
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B. Requirements For Collusion
There are three requirements for a successful price-fixing conspiracy.21
First, the participants must agree on all aspects of the typical transaction,
including price, quality, service, technical advice, delivery terms and
schedules, and credit arrangements. If they focused only on price, the par-
ticipants would dissipate extra profits through nonprice competition.22
Second, the colluders must coordinate their efforts. In Figure 1, if price is
to remain at the supercompetitive level of Pm, output must be restricted to
Qn. 23 Third, the cartel must have some compliance mechanism to dampen
the urge to cheat on the agreement. 4 If these requirements are not
met-and we do not think they are met in Florida-any price fixing con-
spiracy will fail.
C. Conditions Conducive to Collusion
There are several conditions that are conducive to collusion.25 Among
the most important are: (1) a limited number of sellers, (2) substantial
barriers to entry, (3) product homogeneity,26 and (4) inelasticity of de-
mand at competitive prices." Here we are concerned with whether these
21. See Elzinga, New Developments on the Cartel Front, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 3 (1984); Hay,
Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Policy, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 439 (1982).
22. See generally Stigler, Price and Non-Price Competition, 76 J. POL. ECON. 149 (1968) (de-
tailed examination of nonprice competition). If every aspect of a transaction is not homogeneous across
rival sellers, consumers will prefer one seller to another and the stability of the cartel can be
undermined.
23. In a cartel the participants must determine each firm's output. This will assure that the cor-
rect industry output is produced. Moreover, it will establish market shares so that the firms will have
no reason to resort to nonprice competition to determine sales.
24. A few commentators have examined the problem of what a cartel may do to prevent cheating.
See, e.g., Orr & MacAvoy, Price Strategies to Promote Cartel Stability, 32 ECONOMICA 186 (1965);
Osborne, Cartel Problems, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 835 (1976); Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J.
POL. ECON. 44 (1964). Cheating can occur through price shading and excessive production as well as
through more subtle means such as product quality improvement, better service, and more favorable
credit terms.
25. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 169-98
(2d ed. 1980) (survey of conditions); see also R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 19, at 151-52.
There is empirical support for the importance of these conditions. See Hay & Kelley, An Empirical
Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. & ECON. 13 (1974).
26. Sellers can more easily set a collusive price when their products are similar. Perfect product
homogeneity, however, is rare because seemingly similar products can be differentiable based on a
number of factors such as the terms of sale. In addition, buyers may be heterogenous in their product
preferences and buying patterns, further diminishing the likelihood of successful collusion among sell-
ers. For instance, differences in order sizes, credit lines, and the likelihood of repeat purchases make
collusion more difficult. R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 19, at 151. Thus, differences in the
terms of policy coverage and variations among insurance purchasers' preferences reduce the ability of
insurance companies to collude.
27. The more insensitive insurance purchasers are to premium increases, the greater the incentive
for insurance companies to collude. This result stems from the relatively greater increase in profits
following a price increase in a market with inelastic demand compared with elastic demand. See, R.
BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra, note 19, at 151.
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conditions are present to a significant extent in the Florida market. The
structure-conduct-performance paradigm of industrial organization guides
our analysis.28
II. Market Structure in Florida
Our empirical analysis begins with an examination of the importance of
market structure. We then review the dynamics of the medical malpractice
insurance crisis in Florida in an attempt to isolate problems which could
result from market structure. We examine in detail the market concentra-
tion exhibited by Florida's medical malpractice insurance industry. Also,
we explore a series of potential barriers to entry: statutory hurdles, gen-
eral business considerations, regulatory considerations, cost disadvantages,
economies of scale, sunk costs, and claims-made policies. This examina-
tion demonstrates that although the market for medical malpractice insur-
ance in Florida is highly concentrated, the market should still perform in
a competitive fashion-collusion should not be feasible-because market
entry is relatively easy.
A. The Importance of Market Structure
Relatively few firms sell medical malpractice liability insurance in Flor-
ida, raising concern whether insurers are charging noncompetitive prices
and thereby earning excessive profits. In order to evaluate this charge, this
Part discusses the role of market structure in medical malpractice insur-
ance markets with particular emphasis on the traditional structure-con-
duct-performance paradigm.29 Economists use this paradigm to analyze
economic performance in markets that are neither clearly competitive nor
clearly monopolistic. Economic performance, measured by profitability,
depends on the conduct of sellers and buyers in the marketplace. Conduct
within the industry, in turn, depends upon market structure.
Market structure refers to several factors including the number and size
distribution of sellers and buyers, the existence of barriers to entry, the
importance of scale economies in determining the minimum efficient size
for a firm, and the extent of vertical integration. A number of empirical
studies support the theory that structure determines prices and profits."
28. For a discussion of this paradigm, see infra note 29 and accompanying text .
29. The paradigm is attributable to the seminal insights of Edward S. Mason. See, e.g., Mason,
The Current State of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1949);
Mason, Price and Production Policies of Large Scale Enterprise, 29 AM. ECON. REV. 61 (Papers &
Proc. 1939). A few scholars have developed further Mason's original perspectives. See J. BAIN, IN-
DUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 19-43 (1959); F. SCHERER, supra note 25, at 3-6.
30. For a survey of these empirical efforts, see Weiss, The Concentration-Profits Relationship
and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 184 (1974); see also D. HAY
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The closer that an industry's structure is to monopoly, the more likely we
are to observe non-competitive profits, which indicate that prices are above
the competitive level while quantities are below the competitive level. 1
B. Manifestations of the Crisis in the Florida Market
Florida physicians have complained bitterly that they can no longer
afford to pay their medical malpractice insurance premiums. A review of
the premium data displayed in Table 1 illustrates the source of these com-
plaints." This Table shows that the cost of a claims-made"3 medical mal-
practice policy with limits of $1,000,000 per occurrence and $3,000,000
aggregate has soared. For example, the malpractice premium for a family
practitioner in Dade or Broward County increased from $4310 to $18,415
over a four and one-half year period. This increase is at an annual rate of
72.7% for a low-risk specialty. Average annual increases for obstetrics and
neurological surgery, two high-risk specialties, were 98.5% and 91.6%,
respectively.
Medical malpractice premiums increased rapidly not only in absolute
terms but also relative to physician gross revenue. For example, an obste-
trician's medical malpractice premiums as a percentage of gross revenue
rose from 10.3% in 1983-84 to 23.1% in 1986-87. Thus, physicians are
not passing on much of the increase in insurance costs to the consumer. 4
There are indications that the quantity of insurance in Florida has de-
clined. For example, a survey of the major medical malpractice insurers in
Florida revealed a decrease in the number of policies in force from 27,571
& D. MORRIS, INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS (1979). There is some doubt, however, that profits are an
accurate measure of economic performance. See Lacey, The Competitiveness of the Property-Liability
Insurance Industry: A Look at Market Equity Values and Premium Prices, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 501
(1988) (suggesting that equity values should be used instead of profit figures to measure economic
performance.).
31. These are obviously issues of affordability and availability.
32. See infra Table 1. The data represent weighted averages of the rates charged by three major
Florida insurers: St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, Florida Physicians Insurance Com-
pany, and Physicians Protective Trust Fund. The weights are the number of doctors currently insured
by each company divided by the total number of insured doctors.
33. A claims-made policy covers all claims filed after the policy's retroactive date and before its
expiration date. Generally, the retroactive date for a current policy is the date at which the insured's
first policy started. E. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 581-82 (4th ed. 1986);
see also infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (discussing claims-made policies as potential entry
barrier).
34. Because of competitive pressures, physicians have been less able than in the past to pass on
cost increases. A sharp increase in the number of practicing physicians in Florida and the widespread
development of preferred provider organizations and health maintenance organizations have brought
greater competition to health care markets. Competition has also increased due to more sophisticated
medical cost controls that various health care payers use to monitor doctors' fees; these payers are
frequently reducing or refusing to pay physicians' fees they consider excessive. Each of these factors
reduces the ability of doctors to pass along increased costs including medical malpractice insurance
increases.
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in 1983 to 21,844 in 1986.0 In addition, cancellations, which are moti-
vated by the insurer, and non-renewals, which may be at the discretion of
either the insurer or the insured, have been substantial in absolute num-
bers and as a percentage of policies in force.36 Although some physicians
forego medical malpractice insurance, physicians who cannot find cover-
age in the voluntary insurance market are guaranteed insurance with the
Florida Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association (JUA),
which serves as the insurer of last resort.37
In short, Florida's experience is consistent with the theoretical predic-
tions of the collusion model. Premiums have risen and quantities appear
to have fallen. Yet, this evidence alone is not sufficient to prove the exis-
tence of collusion.
35. Schedule 4A of the Insurance Company Questionnaire the Academic Task Force sent out
revealed the following medical malpractice policy counts in Florida:







These data include the larger physicians' trust fund as well as Florida's joint underwriting associa-
tion. They do not include the smaller trust funds.
36. Schedule 4A of the Academic Task Force's Insurance Company Questionnaire provided the
following data on cancellations and non-renewals:







37. The Florida legislature established the JUA in 1975 during the previous medical malpractice
insurance crisis. The JUA is required to issue policies to all applicants at rates set by the JUA and
approved by the Department of Insurance. These rates are typically higher than the rates in the
voluntary insurance market. If the JUA experiences a deficit, the participating physicians may be
assessed an additional fee of up to one-third of their insurance premium. If the assessment does not
cure the deficit, all liability insurers in Florida will be assessed a fee to eliminate the deficit on a pro
rata basis according to their liability insurance volume.
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C. Distribution of Firms by Number and Size
Table 2 displays the medical malpractice insurers"8 that reported Flor-
ida sales to A.M. Best 9 or to the Department of Insurance for 198540
arranged from the largest to the smallest."' Of the sixty-two insurers re-
porting, fourteen underwrote less than $100 in new medical malpractice
insurance during 1985. Three more reported negative premiums written,
which indicates that they did not underwrite any medical malpractice in-
surance in 1985 and that they cleared their books from preceding years.
Many of the remaining forty-four firms are quite small. Generally, these
smaller firms are writing national programs for nurses, chiropractors, and
other health care practitioners; their Florida premiums represent Florida's
share of their national plans.
We first briefly analyze potential competition. It is notable that some of
the largest firms in the property/casualty insurance industry currently
have a small presence in Florida's medical malpractice market. These
eight firms are listed in Table 6. In 1985, for example, these insurers
accounted for some $36.6 billion in premiums written. This figure
amounted to approximately twenty-four percent of the entire property/
casualty industry in the United States. Individually and collectively these
firms could provide formidable competition for the major medical mal-
practice insurers in Florida, particularly if entry is easy.4 2
Two of the most common ways of summarizing the size distribution of
firms in an industry are concentration ratios and the Herfindahl index.
Both provide useful yardsticks for measuring the degree of concentration
within the medical malpractice insurance markets. The main virtue of the
38. Individual insurance companies are often part of the same commonly owned management
group. For example, the Prudential group includes Gibraltar Casualty Company, Prudential Com-
mercial Insurance, Prudential Property & Casualty, and Prudential Reinsurance Company. Even
though these individual companies may have considerable operating autonomy, common ownership
makes it sensible to treat them collectively as a single firm. Thus, by "firm" or "insurer," this Article
may refer either to an insurance company or group of companies commonly owned.
39. A.M. Best & Co. provides periodic statistical reports of insurance sales by company and line
of coverage.
40. For medical practice, at least two insurers did not report to A.M. Best in 1984 and 1985; we
added these to the totals reported by A.M. Best. Similar data for the years 1981-84 are available but
the patterns are not qualitatively different.
41. It is important to recognize that Table 2 does not cover all of the trust funds, which provide a
substantial amount of medical malpractice insurance coverage. See infra Table 2.
42. See infra Table 6. If entry and exit are perfectly free, there can be no market
power-incumbent firms cannot raise price above the competitive level. See R. BLAIR & D.
KASERMAN, supra note 19. But no one has found a perfectly contestable market, one with absolutely
free entry and exit. Thus, the relevant question is, how easy is entry? See Bailey & Baumol, Deregu-
lation and the Theory of Contestable Markets, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 111 (1984); Schmalensee, Ease of
Entry: Has the Concept Been Applied Too Readily?, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1987); see also Meyer
& Tye, Toward Achieving Workable Competition in Industries Undergoing a Transition to Deregu-
lation: A Contractual Equilibrium Approach, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 273 (1988).
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concentration ratio is its mathematical simplicity. The n-firm concentra-
tion ratio simply reports the percentage of industry sales accounted for by
the n largest firms.4 3 Most economists and antitrust lawyers are more
familiar with concentration ratios than with any other measure because of
their ready availability. In addition, economists have used concentration
ratios extensively in empirical efforts to control for market structure.""
Empirical economic studies indicate that market concentration and
profits are positively correlated when the four-firm concentration ratio
exceeds seventy-five percent."5 The greater the level of concentration
within an industry, ceteris paribus, the greater the potential for anticom-
petitive behavior and noncompetitive prices. Table 3 displays the one-
firm, four-firm, eight-firm, and twenty-firm concentration ratios for the
medical malpractice insurers in Florida between 1981 and 1985. These
concentration ratios are high for medical malpractice insurance; for exam-
ple, the four-firm concentration ratio exceeded the seventy-five percent
threshold in each year.
A second measure of concentration is the Herfindahl index (H) which
equals the sum of the squares of n firms' market shares. Table 4 presents
the Herfindahl indices for medical malpractice insurance in Florida for
1981-85. The U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines contain a
scale of critical H values that the Department uses in its analysis of mar-
ket structure.4 6 The Antitrust Division, which was responsible for deter-
mining these critical values, considers a market to be unconcentrated if H
is less than 1000, as a result, the Antitrust Division will not challenge
mergers in such industries. If the value of H falls in the interval between
1000 and 1800, the industry is considered to be moderately concentrated,
which increases the Division's concern about possible exercises of market
power. Nonetheless, within this range a merger is not likely to be chal-
lenged unless it produces a 100 point increase in H. Finally, if H exceeds
1800, the industry is considered to be highly concentrated.
43. The Federal government publishes concentration ratio data on an aggregated basis under the
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. Because of disclosure rules only the four-firm, eight-
firm, twenty-firm, and fifty-firm concentration ratios are available for most industries. One limitation
of concentration ratios data is that diverse activities may be grouped under one classification. These
data are the best that can be obtained for large-scale empirical studies.
44. There is a theoretical link between market shares and an index of monopoly power. See
Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv, 937, 944 (1981); Saving,
Concentration Ratios and the Degree of Monopoly, 2 INT'L ECON. REV. 139, 139-46 (1970). Leo-
nard Weiss has synthesized almost 80 of these studies in an interesting survey article. See Weiss,
supra note 30, at 184-232.
45. Weiss, supra note 30, at 204-17. See also, infra Table 3.
46. See ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, (1984) in Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1169, at S-1-S-16 (Spec. Supp. June 14, 1984); see also infra Table 4.
For a more detailed discussion of the Herfindahl index, see Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith & Simon,
supra, note 14 at 382.
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Table 4 shows that the medical malpractice market in Florida is
"highly concentrated" since the Herfindahl index has exceeded 2000 in
every year. These ratios depict a market structure similar to that
presented by the concentration ratios. Florida's market structure is not
unusual compared with Herfindahls from other states.4 Nonetheless, the
H-values and the concentration ratios are high enough in Florida to war-
rant some concern. A conclusion that these structural indicators signify a
lack of competition is, however, premature."'
D. Entry Barriers9
Market power is the ability to raise price above the competitive level by
restricting output-the ability to create affordability and availability
problems.8 A group of incumbent firms can exercise market power only if
the market is protected from the entry of potential competitors. If market
entry is so easy that existing competitors cannot successfully raise prices
for any significant period of time, then market power is absent and com-
petitive forces determine prices and quantities. Because of the highly con-
centrated market structure for medical malpractice insurance in Florida, it
is necessary to evaluate entry conditions.
This section's analysis of entry barriers has three sub-sections. First, we
examine statutory entry requirements. In many regulated industries, firms
must obtain permission from a state agency to enter the marketplace. Sec-
ond, we present an evaluation of responses from a sample of insurers
asked to identify entry barriers. Third, we assess the ease with which
firms can enter Florida's medical malpractice insurance market.
47. Table 5 shows the Herfindahl indices for the individual states and the District of Columbia,
See infra Table 5. Thirty-four states have higher concentration ratios than Florida while sixteen have
lower concentration ratios. The comparisons for the years 1981-84 are qualitatively the same as those
in Table 5.
48. Economists argue that even in highly concentrated markets, if the markets are characterized
by easy entry and exit, the market can be contested readily and performs in a competitive fashion. See
Bailey, Contestability and the Design of Regulatory and Antitrust Policy, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 178
(1981); Bailey & Baumol, supra note 42; Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory
of Industry Structure, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (Papers & Proc. 1982); Baumol, Bailey & Willig, Weak
Invisible Hand Theorems on the Sustainability of Multiproduct Natural Monopoly, 67 AM. EcoN.
REV. 350 (1977); Baumol & Willig, Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers, and the Sustainability
of Monopoly, 96 Q.J. ECON. 405 (1981); cf Meyer & Tye, supra note 42.
49. For the perspectives of an early advocate of the role that entry barriers play in industrial
performance, see J. BAIN, BARRIERS To NEw COMPETITION (1956). For a somewhat different inter-
pretation, see G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67-70 (1968).
50. See Landes & Posner, supra note 44, at 937.
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1. Statutory Entry Barriers in Florida
Florida statutes require domestic, foreign,51 and alien5' insurance com-
panies to receive certificates of authority before selling insurance in the
state.53 There are three qualifications for receiving a certificate of author-
ity: (1) capital funds requirements, (2) extensive disclosure of financial
and other information, and (3) operating histories for certain out-of-state
insurers."
First, medical malpractice insurance applicants must meet various paid-
in capital and surplus requirements prior to original issuance of a certifi-
cate of authority. These applicants must maintain $750,000 of unimpaired
paid-in capital.5" An established insurer expanding into additional lines
must meet the surplus requirements for each kind of insurance that the
insurer proposes to transact."" In addition to paid-in capital, each insurer
must maintain a surplus equal to the greater of $1,000,000 or an amount
computed under a statutory requirement. For medical malpractice insur-
ers, the statutory requirement is ten percent of the total of its net
reserves. 
57
Second, applicants for a certificate of authority must file forms and
comments with the Department of Insurance (DOI) that disclose adminis-
trative information5 and operating plans for the next three years. 59 Dis-
closure of administrative information is not costly. However, disclosing the
operating plans for the next three years may require more extensive
costs.' 0
51. A "foreign" insurer is one whose primary place of business is outside the state. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 624.06(2) (Harrison 1984).
52. An "alien" insurer is one whose principal place of business is outside the United States. Id. §
624.06(3).
53. Id. § 624.4019(1). All insurers must receive certificates of authority unless a statutory excep-
tion applies. Id; see also id. § 624.413 (Harrison Supp. 1987) (application for certificate of authority);
FLORIDA DEP'T OF INS., APPLICATION FOR LICENSE, PROPERTY, CASUALTY, MARINE, SURETY
AND TITLE COMPANIES, AND RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES (1987); FLORIDA DEP'T OF INS., ORGANI-
ZATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA (1987).
54. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.404. (Harrison 1984). The $25 filing fee and $200 annual license tax
are insignificant barriers.
55. Id. § 624.407, .501.
56. Id. § 624.408(2).
57. Id. § 624.408(1)(b) (Harrison Supp. 1985). Any insurer with a surplus greater than $100
million, however, is not required to increase or maintain surplus in accordance with these provisions.
Also, insurers expanding into additional lines within three years of receiving an initial certificate of
authority must meet the same surplus requirements that are required for an original certificate cover-
ing all the kinds of insurance that the insurer proposes to transact. Id. § 624.408(2).
58. Administrative information includes the insurer's charter, by-laws, and financial documents
relating to the company's structure, and operating history.
59. Preparation of this three-year plan is probably moderately expensive, particularly for smaller
insurers. Most of the information, however, should be readily available and not pose much additional
cost.
60. The DOI requires a three-year operating plan that must include: types of insurance, planned
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Third, a foreign insurer is not authorized to transact insurance in Flor-
ida unless it has operated satisfactorily for at least three years 1 in its state
or country of domicile."
In sum, Florida's statutory entry barriers are relatively easy to meet.
The primary barriers for domestic, foreign, and alien insurers are the
capital and surplus requirements. These capitalization requirements are
not severe in relation to manufacturing industries. 6 Moreover, entry can
be accomplished relatively quickly. An incumbent insurer can add lines or
sub-lines of insurance simply by satisfying any additional capital and sur-
plus requirements that the statutes require. New domestic firms can es-
tablish operations in as little as a year. Established foreign insurers6' can
enter in a matter of months. Florida statutes thus impose few entry
barriers.
2. Questionnaire Results On Entry Barriers
The barriers to entry that the surveyed insurers identified fall into three




For the most part, the business considerations are not significant obsta-
cles to entering a new line or sub-line of insurance in Florida; they do not
volume by line at three-month intervals, a marketing plan including use of agents and brokers, use of
reinsurance, statement of any expected changes, description of insurance history of each individual by
management position in eight areas, and a statement of any consultants or experts the insurer uses.
See FLORIDA DEP'T OF INS., supra note 53.
61. The DOI may waive this requirement if the foreign or alien insurer: (1) has operated success-
fully and has capital and surplus of $5 million, (2) is the wholly owned subsidiary of an insurer
which is an authorized insurer in Florida, (3) is the successor in interest through merger or consolida-
tion of an authorized insurer, or (4) provides a product or service not readily available to the state's
consumers. Thus, foreign insurers can avoid the three year entry lag in providing medical malpractice
coverage if the DOI feels that such coverage would otherwise not readily be available. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 624.404(2) (Harrison 1984).
62. Id.
63. The capital requirements necessary to enter into insurance markets are minimal in both an
absolute and relative sense. See generally W. ADAMS, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY
(6th ed. 1982) (comparative survey of agricultural, petroleum, steel, automobile, breakfast cereal, beer,
computer, telephone, banking, major league sports, and physicians services industries).
64. Those with a satisfactory three-year operating record or other exception. FLA. STAT. ANN., §
624.404(2) (Harrison 1984).
65. As part of the research for the ACADEMIC TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 5,
at 24, the staff surveyed the major liability insurance carriers doing business in Florida. Twenty-eight
of the thirty-one carriers completed a 160 page questionnaire on loss payments, profitability, and
other aspects of their operations in Florida. This is a synthesis and summary of the responses to the
Academic Task Force's Insurance Company Questionnaire, Part II, Question 12, id, at 80, which
asked the respondent to identify the three most significant barriers to entry faced by a firm that wants
to enter a line or sub-line of insurance.
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involve differentially higher costs for new entrants as opposed to incum-
bents. The obstacles identified include the following: (a) capitalization,66
(b) underwriting experience,67 (c) technical support,6" and (d) marketing.
The minimum requirements for capital and surplus in Florida are not
serious entry barriers.69 Experienced personnel exist in the insurance in-
dustry.7 ' Technical support is a developmental cost, with which insurance
firms are familiar. Finally, although some companies expressed concern
for their ability to determine their competitive position in the market, this
was not an overwhelming factor.1 '
b. Legal Considerations
For the most part, the legal concerns the insurers expressed involved
the tort system. 2 The legal framework within which the insurers must
operate creates uncertainty that may dissuade entry into medical malprac-
tice insurance. Some insurers were concerned about their ability to predict
their underwriting exposure due to the adverse judicial climate including
court decisions that expanded coverage beyond the bounds the insurer
originally contemplated.
c. Regulatory Considerations
In general, regulated firms have concerns about the regulatory environ-
ment. Most of the concerns expressed by the insurers involved incentives
for entry rather than the process of entry. Indeed, the insurers expressed
little concern about their ability to enter the market. Firms were con-
cerned about the effect of regulations on profits"' and the overall tone of
66. Capitalization refers to the entering firm's capital and surplus as well as to access to the
reinsurance market, which expands the firm's effective capital.
67. Underwriting experience refers to the need for experienced personnel and to information on
loss experience.
68. Technical support refers to the need for computer systems and personnel for efficient process-
ing of claims.
69. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing capital and surplus requirements).
70. A firm interested in entering a particular line or sub-line must identify those with experience
and hire them. Acquiring the necessary data base could be a more serious obstacle, but is not unique
to new entrants.
71. An associated marketing concern was the need for the insurer to be recognized as a supplier in
a particular line or sub-line. Interestingly, no one expressed any serious concerns about developing a
distribution system. Apparently, their existing system of employee agents or independent agents can
handle additional lines or sub-lines for them.
72. Most of the responses, however, were not very specific. For example, many respondents al-
luded to adverse case law, the state's overall "judicial climate," or the "legal environment." Where the
respondents were more specific, the major concern was the uncertainty created by some judicial deci-
sions. Angoff, however, argues that insurers have "marketed" the idea of a crisis in the tort system
where the crisis really arises from anti-competitive conditions in the industry. See Angoff, supra note
14 at 412-14.
73. The focus of the insurance questionnaire responses was on the profit potential and regula-
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the regulatory environment." While these factors deter or delay some en-
try, they do not appear to contribute significantly to the overall problem.75
3. Assessing The Ease Of Entry
76
The ease of entry into a market depends upon five factors: (1) the speed
of entry, (2) the existence of cost or demand disadvantages to the entrants,
(3) the existence of scale economies, (4) the presence of sunk costs, and (5)
the prevalence of claims-made policies. A description of each of these fac-
tors follows, with empirical evidence relating to the Florida medical mal-
practice market.
a. Speed of Entry
The competitive threat posed by potential entrants depends upon how
quickly a firm can enter the market. If entry is slow, incumbent firms can
raise price and enjoy extra profits so that the eventual entry will still leave
them with substantial net short-term gains. In that case, the existence of
potential entrants will not deter the incumbent firms from engaging in
noncompetitive behavior. In Florida, the speed of entry depends upon the
potential entrant's status. An existing insurer currently authorized to sell
insurance in Florida can add a line or sub-line of insurance in nine to
fifteen months. A foreign firm with a satisfactory record of performance
elsewhere can enter Florida within a few months. In comparison to the
time it takes to enter most other industries, 7 expansion by an incumbent
insurer or entry by a foreign insurer is relatively fast.
b. Cost and Demand Disadvantages
If entrants face significantly higher production or distribution costs than
do incumbents, the incumbents will enjoy a profit cushion that permits
tion's impact of regulations on profits. More specifically, the firms expressed concern about: (1) the
adequacy of rates, (2) the flexibility of rate setting and underwriting, (3) excess profit laws, (4) joint
underwriting associations, and (5) undue restrictions on underwriting, claims, cancellations, and non-
renewals.
74. If the potential entrant perceives that the regulator is unresponsive to the insurer's need for
adequate and reliable rates, or that regulation or legislation is unresponsive to the need for a profit
opportunity, then the firm may decide not to enter.
75. Only three other aspects of regulation were mentioned by the insurers: (1) regulation may
preclude the use of preferred forms, (2) regulation may require the approval of forms, rates, and
rules, and (3) approval delays.
76. The following discussion relies upon Salop, Measuring Ease of Entry, 31 ANTITRUST BULL.
551 (1986).
77. Entry into many other industries involves time delays due to the construction of physical plant
and other factors such as regulatory approval. These temporal lags vary greatly across both manufac-
turing and service industries. See W. ADAMS, supra note 63 (survey of various industries and their
entry conditions).
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noncompetitive pricing without fear of entry. Similarly, if entrants face
demand disadvantages that require prolonged-or even permanent-price
discounts, the incumbents will have a margin of safety. The incumbent
retains the ability to reduce premium rates and still make a profit.
Entrants with higher costs will be forced to withdraw from the market or
incur sustained losses.
In Florida, there are no obvious cost advantages available to incumbents
or entrants. In addition, brand preferences do not appear to be important
given the presence and importance of a large number of insurers with
little or no name recognition. 8 Finally, entrants do not need to construct
de novo a distribution system since a system of independent agents is
already in place. 9 This existing system, of course, makes entry considera-
bly easier than if an entrant had to assemble an entire distribution net-
work.80 In any event, the insurance company survey indicates that distri-
bution costs are not an important obstacle.
c. Economies of Scale
When there are economies of scale, average costs decline with increases
in output-at least over some range. If scale economies are significant, a
firm must have a substantial volume of sales in order to experience com-
petitive cost levels. This means that entry must be on a large scale and is
consequently more difficult. The Florida market share data reveal the ex-
istence of a large number of small firms in the Florida insurance markets.
The ongoing presence of these small firms indicates that they are not at a
severe cost disadvantage. The recent withdrawal of Florida's two largest
medical malpractice insurers supports the inference that economies of
scale do not play a significant role in the malpractice insurance markets.
If larger insurers had significant cost advantages over smaller insurers, an
exodus of the smaller firms would be likely during periods of increased
costs and decreased profits.81
78. Potential entrants may face entry barriers due to "moral hazard" problems. Because buyers
face the possibility of purchasing insurance from "fly-by-night" companies, first time entrants into
insurance markets may be at a strategic disadvantage vis-a-vis incumbents. Entrants may choose to
enter with high-quality or low-quality products. If they enter with low-quality products simply to
make short run profits, they may be branded "fly-by-nights" and lose consumer acceptance. See Far-
rell, Moral Hazard as an Entry Barrier, 17 RAND J. ECON. 440 (1986).
79. This sytem, termed the American Agency System, is the result of traditional and customary
patters of selling insurance in the United States. One commentator, however, found that the American
Agency System is an inefficient means of distributing insurance compared with direct writing or ex-
clusive agencies. See, Joskow, Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the Property-Liability Insur-
ance Industry, 4 BELL J. ECON 375, 399 (1973).
80. Some commentators criticize the prior approval system of rate regulations as being inefficient.
See, e.g., id.
81. The insurance industry claims that it has experienced severe financial hardship during the
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d. Sunk Costs
Entering a new market is a risky venture; a firm may incur expendi-
tures that it cannot recover upon exit from the industry. These irreversible
costs are termed sunk costs."s Sunk costs raise the entrant's financial expo-
sure and can deter entry."3
In insurance markets, the major sunk costs are associated with estab-
lishing a competitive presence through a distribution network and expend-
itures on advertising. Because of the existing agency system of distribu-
tion, the costs associated with establishing a distribution system do not
appear to be a barrier to entry. Similarly, while some major insurers
attempt to establish name recognition through television and print media
advertising, a substantial number of firms do not follow this route. Conse-
quently, advertising expenditures to increase brand recognition do not
constitute a necessary entry hurdle.
e. Claims-Made Policies
There is one practice which could potentially serve as a major barrier
to the entry of new insurers into the Florida market: the use of claims-
made policies by some insurers. Yet, an examination of the component
pieces of a medical malpractice insurance policy reveals that claims-made
policies should not present significant barriers to entry.
Traditionally, medical malpractice insurance was written under occur-
rence policies. Under those policies, the policy that was in force when
malpractice occurred provided protection for that event, even if the claim
was made years later. Thus, a physician could change insurers without
sacrificing coverage for malpractice events that occurred in the past; mar-
ket entry was relatively easy.
Beginning in 1975, during the previous medical malpractice crisis, in-
surers began writing claims-made policies. When a company issues a
claims-made policy to a physician, the policy includes two important
dates, a retroactive date and an effective date. In order for a claim to be
covered under a policy, the alleged malpractice must have occurred after
the retroactive date, and the claim must be made while the policy is in
present crisis. Based upon its research, the Academic Task Force concluded that, when total return is
examined, the industry's financial position is less precarious than it claims. ACADEMIC TASK FORCE
PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 5, at 51.
82. See M. WATERSON, ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE INDUSTRY 72-74 (1984). Sunk costs are
costs that cannot be eliminated even by ceasing production; they differ from fixed costs which may be
eliminated if a firm decides not to produce.
83. See generally Baumol & Willig, supra note 48 (analyzing role of sunk costs in sustaining
monopolistic market conditions).
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force-before the effective date. As a policy is renewed, the retroactive
date remains constant, and the effective date moves ahead one year.
If a physician terminates a claims-made policy with one insurer and
buys a claims-made policy with another insurer, the new retroactive date
will equal the effective date of the first policy; the new policy will only
cover malpractice events which occur after the old policy expires. The
physician will no longer have coverage for malpractice events that oc-
curred between the retroactive date of the old policy and the retroactive
date of the new policy. If the physician's entire period of practice has been
covered under one claims-made policy, that doctor will have no coverage
for practice prior to the retroactive date of the new policy.
Physicians have two solutions to the problem, but both initially appear
to be expensive. First, the physician can have the former insurer issue an
extended-reporting endorsement, 4 transforming the former claims-made
policy into the equivalent of an occurrence policy. Second, the physician
can have the new insurer assume the risk of the physician's previous prac-
tice and change the retroactive date of the new policy to that of the old
policy. The premium charge for either change may be as much as three
times the annual premiums for claims-made medical malpractice cover-
age."5 This burden for so-called "tail coverage" would appear to make it
difficult for new insurers to enter the market, since their only prospects
would be new physicians just entering practice.
This analysis is overly simplistic, however. There are three components
to malpractice insurance coverage: current liability for past events, current
liability for current events, and future liability for currrent events.86 The
premiums charged for a particular kind of policy should reflect which of
these components are included. For example, the premiums charged for
claims-made coverage should be lower than those for occurrence coverage
because of the elimination of the current liability for past events; premi-
ums for claims-made coverage should reflect the cost of insuring against
only current malpractice claims. 7 Similarly, premiums for tail coverage
84. An extended-reporting endorsement allows claims to be filed after the effective date.
85. Telephone interview with Bernard Webb, Professor, Department of Risk Management, In-
surance, and Business Law, Georgia State University (July 23, 1987).
86. Here "current" refers to the period the existing policy is in force.
87. It is true that a claims-made policy that has been in force for a long time does look like an
occurrence policy. To the extent that the tail coverage included in a long-standing claims-made policy
is free, the effective premium is actually lower than the nominal premium; the fair market value of
the tail coverage amounts to a discount on the insurance policy. Low prices can surely prevent entry,
but, assuming that these lower prices are not predatory, the fact that a claims-made policy is priced
below an occurrence policy should not constitute a barrier to entry. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 3
ANTITRUST LAW 150-80 (1978). The only reservation here is that physicians may view the premi-
ums paid toward the tail coverage in a long standing claims-made policy as a sunk cost, and so they
may be reticent to change insurers.
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should reflect the costs of providing for current liabilities for past events. 88
In general, the premium that a physician pays for each piece of coverage
should reflect the cost of assuming the corresponding portion of liability. 9
If the prices for each component are competitive, other potential insurers
will not want to enter because there are no excess profits luring them into
this market. Suppose, however, that the premiums charged for a segment
of coverage are not competitive. In this case, the incumbent insurers are
earning excess profits because the premiums exceed the costs of providing
the current coverage.90 If this were the case, an entrant91 could offer a
policy that would provide the coverage at a price below that of the incum-
bent insurer. As a consequence of the potential for competition for each
piece of insurance coverage, the emergence of the claims-made policy does
not necessarily result in a serious entry barrier.
In short, there is ready access to Florida's medical malpractice insur-
ance market. There is little evidence of any significant cost advantages,
economies of scale, or other barriers to market entry. The potential bar-
rier to entry posed by the prevalence of claims-made policies can be over-
come as long as there are no other substantial barriers to entry.
III. Alternative Causes of the Crisis
We can point to several alternative factors that have played a role in
creating the medical malpractice insurance crisis in Florida.9" First, the
88. There should be no cost advantages to aggregating the liabilities for current and past malprac-
tice events, so disaggregating the insurance coverage into these components should not create a cost
disadvantage for any potential entrant. The time it takes for a market to develop for this type of
coverage may cause some initial concern. However, given that entry is easy in other respects, this
concern should pass; new insurers can enter the market to compete when prices are above the compet-
itive level. Similarly, the lump sum nature of this liability may make the initial premiums for this
type of coverage higher than for current coverage, but these rates should decline as time passes and the
probability of being sued declines.
89. It should even be possible to issue coverage of future liabilities for current malpractice events
or future liabilities for future malpractice events. The cost of these policies, however, may be
prohibitive.
90. "Excess" profit does not have a pejorative connotation in this instance. Profits are deemed
excessive if they are larger than necessary to keep resources invested in the industry. This occurs if
revenues exceed costs including a competitive return on the firm's invested capital.
91. The role of entry in the competitive market is to adjust productive capacity so that changes in
supply will push price to the level of average cost. If price is already equal to average cost, there will
be no economic profits to attract new entrants. See R. LIPsEY, P. STEINER & S. PURVIS, ECONOMICS
225-26 (7th ed. 1984).
92. A complete analysis of these factors is beyond the scope of this Article. For an examination of
these factors on a national level, see Angoff, supra note 14 (statutory protection creates anti-competi-
tive market conditions); Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith & Simon, supra note 14 (discussion of collu-
sion, imprudent business practices, government regulation, and changing tort liability); Lefkin, Shat-
tering Some Myths on the Insurance Liability Crisis: A Comment on the Article by Clarke, Warren-
Boulton, Smith, and Simon, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 417 (1988) (expansion of tort system caused crisis);
R. A. Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competative Insurance Markets, 5 YALE J.
ON REG. 455 (1988) (discussing insurance market cyclicality).
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growth of insurance premiums is cost-driven. The rate of growth of mal-
practice premiums is directly related to the insurance industry's expecta-
tions that the frequency and size of malpractice settlements and jury
awards will continue to increase.9" Second, transaction costs associated
with the processing of medical malpractice claims are also important. In
fact, attorneys' fees and other litigation costs account for some forty per-
cent of the total costs incurred by insurers.94 Third, insurers base their
rates on the premise that aggregate premiums will exceed the expected
costs of providing malpractice coverage. Many insurers have indicated that
the litigation explosion changed their expectations, resulting in the need to
increase premiums to remain profitable. 95 Finally, part of the current
medical malpractice crisis is due to the underwriting cycle.96
Conclusion
The current medical malpractice insurance crisis appears not to have
arisen from the structure of the market. In fact, the current market struc-
ture should help to prevent collusion.9"
This Article demonstrates that the market for medical malpractice in-
surance in Florida is heavily concentrated. In 1985, the Herfindahl index
93. During the period 1975-86, insurance carriers paid approximately $513 million for physician
medical malpractice claims. This figure includes all claims paid whether through settlement or follow-
ing litigation. See ACADEMIC TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 5, at 44. Total paid
claims were relatively unchanged in earlier years (1975-79), but showed sharp increases over the
1979-84 period. Over the entire observed period, total paid claims have grown at a compound annual
rate of some 20%. Since 1979, however, the rate of change jumped to nearly 30% per year. Data for
Florida closed claims are available by medical specialty. Five specialties-obstetrics and gynecology,
orthopedics, general surgery, general practice, and internal medicine-accounted for approximately
53% of all claims paid, id. at 48. These results are due to an increase in both the frequency of claims,
id. at 111-18, and the amounts per claim, id. at 126-28. These data, however, indicate that the
growth of the amount per claim is a somewhat more important factor influencing the growth of loss
payments.
94. Id. at 198. Over the 1975-86 period, defense costs per claim have more than tripled. At the
same time that the number of cases filed has also risen. Id. at 192.
95. Because insurance is sold to cover future contingent claims, rates are based on expected costs
that are a function of both the probability of being sued and the probability of an adverse judgment,
as well as the size of jury verdicts and the transactions costs of handling claims and litigation. The
scope of medical malpractice tort liability remains in flux. Jury awards are not only large, but are
highly variable. Also, the probability of being sued is uncertain. In Florida, the interaction of these
variables has resulted in dramatic increases in loss payments and uncertainty which, in turn, has
contributed in large part to overall premium increases.
96. ACADEMIC TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 5, at 89-92. When investment
opportunities are plentiful, insurers try to attract more funds for investment purposes by lowering
premiums. This process is analogous to a financial institution raising the rates it pays on deposits. In
the insurance industry, insurers may absorb low or even negative underwriting profits in order to
attain high returns on the insurer's subsequent investment portfolio. When investment opportunities
disappear, the demand for funds falls and underwriting profits become more important. As a conse-
quence, insurers raise premiums. In fact, this cycle occurred in the 1984-86 period and contributed to
the increase in insurance premiums. Id. at 91; see also R.A. Winter, supra note 92, at 450-63.
97. For a similar conclusion, see Lacey, supra note 30.
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was 2451,98 which indicates that the numbers-equivalent 99 was approxi-
mately four. This result is consistent with the fact that the four-firm con-
centration ratio was 81.6%.1"' It is intuitively clear that these measures of
concentration would tend to reach similar results."° But concentration
data for medical malpractice markets are not dispositive.
This Article has shown that entry into these markets is relatively easy.
As a result, firms authorized to do business in Florida can easily begin
selling medical malpractice insurance in Florida. Indeed, the presence of
other large insurance firms with the potential to expand their presently
small share of Florida's malpractice insurance market indicates that the
market is still basically open and competitive.' Moreover, no physician
is confined to the voluntary (private) market; physicians may always turn
to the JUA. Consequently, firms attempting collusively to set noncompeti-
tive premiums should face stiff competition. Collusion cannot succeed.
These factors, combined with evidence that profits have not been exces-
sive,"0 lead to the conclusion that market structure has not been a demon-
strable cause of increased premium rates. But the fact remains that medi-
cal malpractice insurance premiums are skyrocketing in Florida. The
premiums are very high in an absolute sense and their rate of growth is
startling. Physicians are refusing to provide care and lives are endangered.
There are many factors contributing to these problems. Collusion, how-
ever, does not appear to be one of them. Our admonition in this regard is
simple: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." Policymakers should direct their
attention away from market structure and towards more likely causes of
the present crisis. '
98. See infra Table 4 and discussion supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
99. The numbers-equivalent indicates the number of firms with equal market shares that gener-
ates a particular Herfindahl index. For example, a market with five firms each having a 20% market
share generates a Herfindahl of 2000; five is the numbers-equivalent for a market with a 2000
Herfindahl. See Adelman, Comment on the 'H' Concentration Measure as a Numbers-Equivalent, 51
REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 99 (1969). The author proves that the reciprocal of the Herfindahl index
in decimal form provides the numbers-equivalent for that particular value of H (Numbers-Equivalent
= I/(H/1000). For example, the numbers-equivalent of H = 2451 is (1/(0.2541)) which equals
4.08. Note that Herfindahls and concentration ratios measure actual market conditions. The numbers-
equivalent is simply a comparative measure.
100. See infra Table 3 and supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
101. As a general proposition it does not matter much which measure of concentration is used. See
Schmalensee, supra note 42, at 42 (noting that "while there are a variety of measures of concentra-
tion, we know from empirical work that those measures tend to be highly correlated").
102. See supra notes 49-91 and accompanying text (discussing entry barriers).
103. See ACADEMIC TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 5, at 118.
104. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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Florida's Malpractice Insurance Market
Table 1
Medical Malpractice Insurance Rates in Florida
For Selected Specialties: 1983-1987"'6
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1987106
Family Practitioner (no surgery)
Dade/Broward $4,310
Rest of State $3,123
$5,368 $7,206 $11,866 $15,123 $18,415
$3,654 $4,825 $ 7,147 $ 9,122 $10,277
Internal Medicine (minor surgery)
Dade/Broward
Rest of State
$7,825 $9,738 $14,179 $20,090
$5,606 $6,867 $ 9,472 $11,835








Rest of State $17,061
Orthopedic Surgery
Dade/Broward $27,073








$21,971 $27,538 $38,483 $59,893





$30,433 $38,053 $57,218 $99,702










$ 63,205 $ 69,314
$131,360 $165,320
$ 78,979 $ 87,542
Neurological Surgery
Dade/Broward $37,569
Rest of State $27,285
$49,787 $74,967 $115,548 $152,525 $192,420
$34,480 $49,974 $ 70,423 $ 93,100 $102,339
105. Figures are weighted averages of Florida insurers' premium rates calculated by Bernard
Webb, Professor, Department of Risk Management, Insurance, and Business Law, Georgia State
University. Rates are effective as of January 1, 1987.
106. Premium changes effective July 1, 1987.
Specialty
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Table 21"'
Direct Premiums Written - Medical Malpractice
1985
Rank Group Name DPW Dollars
I St. Paul Group $89,674,038
2 Physicians Protect. Trust Fund 43,226,563
3 Florida Phys Ins Co. 24,257,375
4 Cigna Group 15,183,798
5 Evanston Group 8,532,532
6 CNA Ins Cos 7,463,104
7 Health Care Indemn 7,198,963
8 MMI Companies Group 4,875,153
9 Amer Intern Group 2,428,739
10 Hartford Ins Group 2,216,825
11 Fireman's Fund Cos 1,549,307
12 Travlers Ins Group 858,656
13 Nat Chiropractic Mut 850,021
14 Westco Ins Group 695,451
15 Continental Ins Cos 626,823
16 General Re Group 462,815
17 Integrity Ins Co 272,129
18 Cincinnati Fin Group 239,987
19 Amer Financial Group 182,838
20 Aetna Life and Cas Group 146,440
21 WR Berkley CP Group 138,076
22 United States F&G GR 120,008
23 Protective Casualty 90,520
24 Ranger Ins Group 57,400
25 Orion Group 38,315
26 UMI Group 31,275
27 Virginia Ins Recip 30,060
28 Nationwide Group 23,277
29 Armco Ins. Group 21,664
30 Crum and Forster Cos. 21,443
31 Jefferson Ins. Group 15,651
32 Chubb Grp of Ins. Cos. 11,560
33 United States Inv. Group 2,895
34 Church Mutual Ins 958
35 State Auto Mat Group 944
36 Bershire Hathaway 943
37 Seibels Bruce Group 537
38 Home Ins. Group 524
39 Alliance Ins. Group 375
40 Allstate Ins. Group 363
41 Lincoln Nat. Group 301
42 Safero Ins. Cos. 283
43 Reliance Ins. Cos. 148
44 Comm Credit Group 141
45 Central Mut Ohio Group 122
52.5 Amer General Group
52.5 Royal Ins. Group
52.5 Zurich Amer Ins. Group
52.5 Amer Universal Group *
52.5 Foremost Corp Group
52.5 Whiting National Ins.
52.5 MCM Crop Group
52.5 Medical Protective
52.5 Allianz Group
52.5 Prudential of Am Group **
52.5 Alexander Howden Group
52.5 Signature Group
52.5 Employers Reins Group
52.5 Teledyne Group
60 Liberty Mutual Group 76CR
61 Beneficial Ins. Group 95CR
62 Internat Ins. Co. MD 219,554CR
YEAR $211,329,615
107. A.M. BEST Co., Best Executive Data Service: Property/Casualty and Life/Health (1985); Report of the Department of
Insurance (State of Florida) 1985.
108. " equals less than 100.
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109. AM. BEST Co., Best's Executive Data Service: Property/Casualty and Health/Life (1981-
1985); Report of Department of Insurance (State of Florida) (1984-1985).
110. CR denotes concentration ratio, which measures the percentage of direct premiums written
by the largest, four largest, eight largest, and 20 largest.






























































































































47 1,128 Least Concentrated
A.M. BEST Co., Best's Executive Data Service: Property/Casualty and Life/Health (1985).
N denotes the number of firms reporting.
H denotes the Herfindahl index.
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Table 6115





























115. A.M. BFST Co., Best's Executive Data Service: Property/Casualty and Life/Health (1985).
116. Based upon direct premiums written in all property/casualty lines during 1985.

